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RON COFFEY: THE THINKER'S
THINKER
Peter M Gerhartt
Good thought does not come in predetermined categories; there is
no necessary division between legal thought, economic thought, and
philosophical thought, or between contract and torts. Good thought
avoids the superficial and general, focusing instead on the particular
and the precise. Good thought works out the models that allow us to
organize our beliefs about cause and effect and values and behavior
and to compare models across subject matter. Good thought avoids
using words that are ambiguous or vacuous, except when we
acknowledge their use as placeholders until our analysis permits
greater specificity. Good thought seeks to analyze, which means to
tear things apart into constituent parts and then reconstruct a way of
thinking about the problem we are working on in a way that reveals
the normative justification for one course of action over another.
Ronald J. Coffey was among the first on our faculty, and (I
daresay) in the country, to recognize these attributes of good thought
and to bring them to bear on the study of law. He has been passionate
about methodology-that is, about the modes of thought that are the
hallmark of good analysis. He understands legal analysis not as the
application of rules, doctrine or abstract principles, but the other way
around-as the construction of the outcome (and therefore of rules,
doctrine, and principles) that comports with a justification rooted in
an understanding of the kind of problem the law faces, the kinds of
values that ought to be considered in addressing the problem, and the
behavioral traits of people that allow us to predict how people will act
in light of social and socially constructed (i.e., legal) incentives. We
came to call this justificational analysis. It is what good legal scholars
do.
t Professor, Case Western Reserve School of Law and former Dean (1986-1996).
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Ron's methodology is interdisciplinary, drawing on the best and
newest insights from virtually every field of study. Although his own
thought has been most closely identified with what came to be called
economic analysis, his attraction to economics was methodological,
not substantive. The economists had seemed to discover, before other
behavioral sciences, the value of models and systematic thought. This
allowed economists to break matters down to their core causal
elements, to identify underlying assumptions, and to use models of
behavioral response to identify what would happen if the underlying
assumptions were changed. It was this systemic thinking about human
behavior in the light of incentives that allowed economists to study
human behavior with specificity and that therefore aligned the
behavioral science of economics with the behavioral science of law. It
was this systematic thinking that attracted Ron to economic analysis.
But Ron was never wedded to a single or narrow view of
economics. He is neither Posnerian nor libertarian; neither Baumolian
nor interventionist. He understands and respects both markets and
market failure, both efficiency and equity. Although skeptical of the
value of legal intervention, he starts his analysis without knowing
where the analysis will take him. His mind does not try to prove that
markets (or the law) generally tend toward efficient results (the
efficiency hypothesis), for he knows this about the efficiency
hypothesis: it is tautological unless the analyst specifies the nature of
the efficiency that is sought and it is unnecessary once the analyst
specifies the nature of efficiency that is sought.
Then, as the analytical rigor of economic analysis began to
infiltrate the other behavioral sciences, Ron rejoiced in seeing how
learning from various behavioral sciences could be interwoven to
create a more complete view of various influences on human
behavior.
Moreover, Ron's reliance on learning from other disciplines is
never an interest in abstract thought or theory for theory's sake. What
matters to him is the application of learning from other disciplines to
the issues the law faces, and the law requires that intervention choices
be made. Therefore, to Ron, interdisciplinary learning must "mesh"
with the law by being integrated into legal analysis, by paying
attention to the institutional setting in which legal decisions are made,
and by appreciating the institutional constraints of a rule-based
system. Ron's intellectual firepower is directed at intensely practical
results: how to understand and advocate within a system that believes
the law to be based on rules, doctrine, and principles. He taught us
that doctrine does not matter until we understand the range of thought
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that allows us to apply doctrine in concrete cases to achieve a justified
result, and that once we understand the appropriate analytical factors
the doctrine comes alive in a way that allows it to be applied in other
situations.
Few, if any, on the faculty have read as widely as Ron. His daily
consumption encompasses not only the major currents in legal
thought but all of the major economic journals, in all phases of
economics. He is consistently ahead of the curve. Amartya Sen was
appreciated in economics, but not in law, before he won the Nobel
Prize, but Ron brought him to our attention long before he was
understood to be a Nobel candidate. And long before behavioral
economics became a buzzword in law, Ron had understood
economics as a behavioral science and therefore understood the
importance of interpreting the rational person in light of
psychological realities. Freakonomics was never freaky to Ron
because he never defined economics by the narrow view of the
rational person. Altruism was not a mystery to Ron because he
understood that economics does not assume the maximization of any
particular value-it only assumes that people (and communities) will
want to maximization some value.
Few, if any, on the faculty have integrated their reading into a
comprehensive view of the foundational theories that are used in
understanding intervention choice. Perhaps Ron's greatest intellectual
gift is his ability to understand the relationship between seeming
disparate phenomena by understanding them as offshoots of common
models of behavior. Consumer decision in the face of uncertainty is
like voter decision in the face of uncertainty, which is like
interpersonal decision in the face of uncertainty, which is like
producer decision in the face of uncertainty, which is like social
decision in the face of uncertainty. Whatever the decision, people or
groups protect themselves against uncertainty in ways that can be
modeled and understood comparatively. And comparing reactions to
uncertainty across contexts allows us to develop a more complete
theory of behavior in the light of uncertainty.
And Ron's thought is not limited to concepts of efficiency.
Although Ron despairs of finding any way of modeling the
efficiency/equity trade-off in a way that would allow us to tractably
compare the apples of equity with the oranges of efficiency, he
marvels at various theories of fairness and is eager to pursue them in
justificational analysis. His only requirement is methodological: is
systematic and analytical thought being applied to theories of fairness
in the same way that we apply it to theories of efficiency?
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Few on the faculty have written as much as Ron, although many
have published much more than Ron. Our students were the
beneficiaries of his writing, for it often came in the form of material
for class. Binders of material that he has prepared stand in his office
as a testament to his comprehensive and diligent pursuit of
justificational analysis in the fields in which he taught. He used his
own material in most of his courses and it was never stale. SarbanesOxley was not an appendix to Ron's material; it was a part of the
material from the time there was a glimmer of the fraud that it
addressed. Not enough of this writing has gotten out of the binders
and into print, but it is not too late. Ron is retiring from teaching but
not from thinking and (it is to be hoped) from publishing. But the
target of his materials is a moving one and in the author's view the
material has never been quite good enough.
Perfectionism, rigor, and integration have their costs, and one of
those costs is that in order to get access to Ron's thought you have to
get access to either his binders or to his conversation about ideas. His
students were lucky, for their access to both the binders and the
conversation was immediate and plentiful. For those colleagues who
took the time to access his ideas, the rewards were many. The
University of Chicago had Aaron Director, a teacher of teachers
whose influence came not from publishing but from thinking broadly
and teaching deeply'; we have had Ron Coffey. For those who took
the effort to access his mind, the force of his thought will be carried
forward in countless of unprogrammed and productive ways.

I

See Aaron DirectorFounded Field of Law and Economics, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
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